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Towards Fairness-Aware Time-Sensitive
Asynchronous Federated Learning for Critical
Energy Infrastructure
Jianfeng Lu, Member, IEEE, Haibo Liu, Zhao Zhang, Jiangtao Wang, Sotirios K. Goudos, Senior Member, IEEE,
Shaohua Wan, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Critical energy infrastructure (CEI) systems are
vital to underpin the national economy and social development,
but vulnerable to cyber attack and data privacy leakage when
distributed machine learning technologies are deployed on them.
Although federated learning (FL) has promoted distributed
collaborative learning while keeping natural compliance with the
privacy protection, it is tremendously difficult to schedule edge
nodes of CEI collaboratively when asynchronous FL tasks are
applied in CEI system, since the CEI system must make an
irrevocable immediate decision on whether to hire a participant
who arrives and departs dynamically without knowing future
information. We tackle this issue by designing fairness-aware and
time-sensitive task allocation mechanisms in asynchronous FL
for CEI. First, we design an optimal multi-dimensional contract
to guarantee the reliability, honesty and fairness, and maximize
the learning accuracy for the fixed deadline scenario. Second,
we design a multi-metric participant recruitment mechanism
to control time consumption for the limited budget scenario,
prove that the problem of optimizing this mechanism is NP-
Hard, and propose an e-approximation algorithm accordingly.
Finally, extensive experiments using both real-world data and
simulated data further demonstrate the effectiveness and effi-
ciency of our proposed mechanisms compared to the state-of-
the-art approaches.
Index Terms—Critical Energy Infrastructure, Federated
Learning, Task Allocation, Fairness-Aware, Time-Sensitive
I. INTRODUCTION
RECENTLY, the prosperities in technologies such as 5G,artificial intelligence, and mobile edge compute have put
forward higher demands on Critical Energy Infrastructures
(CEI) which are some physical facilities to underpin the
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national economy and social development. All of them are
huge in terms of scale and spatially distributed. Moreover,
a large number of edge nodes of CEI makes it difficult
to organize cooperative work and vulnerable to cyber-attack
and data privacy leakage which can cause huge cascading
damage to CEI. Therefore, it is necessary to deploy distributed
machine learning technologies on CEI to regulate them col-
laboratively, and there exist many related research works
to combine distributed machine learning technologies with
CEI [1]. Federated learning (FL), as a promising technique,
naturally solves the problem of privacy protection and has
an advantage in distributed machine learning where data are
collected and processed locally at distributed devices, and then
the updated model parameters are uploaded to a central server
for model aggregation [2]. With the popularity of FL, there is
an increasing number of FL-related studies devoted to this area
[3, 4]. However, when FL is applied in the CEI applications,
there are many challenges that lead to low efficiency and
worse performance [5]. It is tremendously difficult to schedule
edge nodes of CEI effectively to execute collaborative model
training and maintain system sustainability in a long term,
since a mass of heterogeneous distributed edge nodes are
mutually independent and lack of an efficient method to
regulate them collaboratively. To this end, how to effectively
allocate tasks to improve learning accuracy has become a
critical issue when applying FL in CEI systems [6, 7].
There have emerged a lot of works focussing on syn-
chronous FL applied in CEI. On the one hand, it is helpful
for the model owner to select a suitable set of participants
according to some criteria for different objectives in syn-
chronous FL, e.g., time limitation, communication efficiency,
and energy consumption [8, 9]. On the other hand, it incurs
higher communication cost, while also leads to higher idle
durations waiting for slower participants, as the aggregation
must wait for the completion of all local updates [10]. In
contrast, asynchronous FL (AFL) allows the model owner
to recruit arriving data owners online to continuously train
the model, which makes FL more effective. However, time-
sensitivity has become a thorny issue in AFL. This is because
a large number of heterogeneous participants arrive and depart
dynamically in a random manner, meanwhile without knowing
future information, the model owner must make an irrevocable
immediate decision on whether to hire a participant, and
pursue the maximization of individual benefits under some
constraints such as time sensitivity and budget feasibility.
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This prevents the task allocation mechanisms applied to syn-
chronous FL from being directly applied to AFL.
Despite the practical application of AFL has received
widespread attention [11, 12], how to effectively allocate tasks
in AFL, although very urgent, is still largely ignored. To
the best of our knowledge, only [13] attempts to efficiently
perform distributed learning tasks in an asynchronous manner.
However, one-sided pursuit of minimizing the gradient stal-
eness on wireless edge nodes with heterogeneous computing
and communication capacities may present a rather unbalanced
allocation in shared and limited participant pool, which would
be perceived as highly unfair and unacceptable to the worse-
off participants [14, 15]. Although a variety of fairness criteria
such as Max-Min, Kalai-Smorodinsky, and Proportional Fair-
ness already exist in the literature [16], there are concerns
regarding collective fairness rather than individual fairness.
Due to natural rationality and selfishness, once a participant
feels unfair, she will leave the current system to obtain higher
benefit, thereby affecting the sustainability of the system.
Consequently, without considering individual fairness, it is not
feasible to assume that all participants will unconditionally
join the model training task in the practical application of
AFL in CEI [17].
In summary, there exist three main challenges that hinder
the design of efficient task allocation mechanisms for AFL:
C1: Fairness-aware, i.e., it is critical to address the issue
of fairness-aware task allocation mechanisms in AFL in a
principled manner as individual fairness will inevitably affect
her participation, which will further affect the sustainability of
the system. C2: Time-sensitive, i.e., the model owner in AFL
must make an irrevocable immediate decision on whether to
hire a participant who arrives and departs dynamically without
knowing future information, because time sensitivity is directly
related to the effect of AFL. C3: Asymmetric information,
i.e., strategic participants will inevitably take advantage of the
information asymmetry and misreport their private information
(e.g., arriving time, computation capacity) to seek higher
returns.
To tackle these challenges, this paper designs fairness-
aware time-sensitive task allocation mechanisms in AFL for
CEI. In particular, we make use of the ρ-Lipschitz condition
to formalize the individual fairness rather than collective
fairness, and define a new form of fairness named acceptance-
aware fairness (addressing C1), design a multi-metric par-
ticipants recruitment mechanism, which can iteratively adjust
task allocation through forceful interventions to control time
consumption of task training (addressing C2), and introduce
multi-dimensional contract theory, use its self-revealing prop-
erty to hire heterogeneous participants and incentivize them
to complete the training task honestly, thereby maximizing
the learning accuracy of the model under the premise of
asymmetric information (addressing C3). Combining with the
above challenges and realistic demands in a CEI system,
two typical task allocation scenarios in AFL are taken into
account: the fixed deadline scenario where the model training
process needs to be completed before a fixed deadline with
incomplete information, and the limited budget scenario where
the total payment of a model training task to the selected
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Figure 1. The typical process in AFL in CEI.
participants cannot exceed a budget. Our main contributions
are summarized as follows:
• A fairness-aware time-sensitive model for task allocation
in AFL is built to formulate task allocation problem
by working on two typical scenarios where learning
accuracy, time consumption and individual fairness are
taken into consideration concurrently.
• For the fixed deadline scenario, we use entropy theory
and fuzzy comprehensive evaluation to design an optimal
multi-dimensional contract where the optimal contract
value is calculated to guarantee the reliability, honesty
and fairness, so that the learning accuracy is maximized.
• For the limited budget scenario, we design a multi-
metric participant recruitment mechanism to control time
consumption by dynamically adjusting task allocation,
prove that the problem of optimizing this mechanism
is NP-hard, and accordingly propose an e-approximation
algorithm based on relaxed iterative optimization.
• Performance evaluations based on real-world data and
simulated data further demonstrate the effectiveness and
efficiency of our proposed mechanisms in balancing the
learning accuracy, fairness and timeliness compared with
the state-of-the-art mechanisms.
In the rest of this article, Section II introduces the system
model and problem formulation. A multi-dimensional contract
is designed for the fixed deadline scenario in Section III. And
a multi-metric participant recruitment mechanism is designed
for the limited budget scenario in Section IV. Evaluations are
performed in Section V. Finally, conclusions are drawn in
Section VI .
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Basic Setting
As illustrated in Figure 1, a typical AFL in CEI system
consists of a set P = {p1, · · · , pn} of heterogeneous partic-
ipants (i.e., edge nodes), where each one has different data
size and computation capacity. The model owner resides in
a cloud-based platform, and aims at building an effective
model for some CEI applications, such as traffic prediction
and electric vehicle management, and generates a training
task by announcing the time constraint t = (ts, te), where
ts and te denote the start and end time points respectively.
Each participant pi ∈ P arrives in the platform at her
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own time point tai and departs at time point t
l
i. The local
computation duration ti of participant pi mainly depends on
the computation capacity ai and the training data samples qi
which can be denoted as ti = qi/ai. When the local training is
completed at tui = t
a
i +ti, each participant should immediately
upload the updated weight parameters to the model owner in
exchange for rewards.
The process of the model training in AFL can be described
as follows: First, the model owner describes and publishes a
task consisting the context of training and time constraints
(step 1©). Next, participants arrive at a random manner. After
entering the platform, each participant pi needs to report
to the model owner and download the model parameters
from the platform if she is hired (step 2©). Then, the hired
participants use local resources to train task model and submit
the model parameters (step 3©). Finally, the model owner pays
the participants accordingly after receiving the updated model
parameters (step 4©). The above process will be repeated until
the training task is completed.
From the point of rationality and selfishness, both the
model owner and participants are concerned about how to
choose her optimal strategy to maximize her own utility. As
for each participant pi, she will determine how much data
qi it will contribute to the model training, and chooses to
participate in a task when the reward payment ri(tui , qi) can
compensate for her cost ciqi, where ci is the unit data cost. As
participants arrive and depart in a dynamic manner, the reward
payment ri(tui , qi) is also determined by the uploading time
tui . Consequently, the utility of a participant can be defined as
follows.
Definition 1. (Participant’s Utility) The utility of participant





i , qi)− ciqi, if ζi = 1,
0, otherwise, (1)
where the parameter ζi ∈ {0, 1} is a indicator variable refer-
ring whether a participant takes part in the model training.
At the model owner side, her strategy is to determine the
optimal reward payments in R. The model owner will get
more utility by incentivizing participants to contribute more
data. This is because the more data participants contribute to
training the learning model, the higher the model performance
(i.e., prediction accuracy) will be. Following [18], we denote
the model performance as





pi∈P qi refers to the total training data
contributed by all participants, µ and v are weight factors.
We assume that the global model performance gain has
diminishing returns with respect to data quality and quantity.
Intuitively, there exists a limit to model performance where
limQ→∞ 1− e−µ(Q)
v
= 1. Formally, the utility of the model
owner can be defined as follows.
Definition 2. (Model Owner’s Utility) The utility of the model
owner is defined as







SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS IN THIS PAPER
Variable Description





i arriving time, leaving time and completing time of ith participant.
qi , q̃i ,Q, Q̃ contributed, own data of pi ,Q =
∑
pi∈P




ai , ci computation capacity and unit data cost of ith participant.
ζi indicator variable ζi ∈ {0, 1}.
λ, Λ conversion parameter, model performance function.
ui , us utility of ith participant, utility of the model owner.
ξm , ˆξm predicted value and real value by the training model.
θi ith type of participant.
si the task contribution score of ith participant.
ri ,R the optimal reward of ith participant,R = {r1, · · · , rn}.
d,D difference function of contribution and utility between two participants.
where conversion parameter λ is used to turn the model
performance into the model utility.
B. Acceptance-Aware Fairness
How to effectively allocate tasks in AFL is essentially
an allocation optimization problem with limited resources.
Blindly pursuing the maximization of the model owner’s
benefit may present a rather unbalanced allocation in shared
and limited participant pool. In addition to maximizing the
benefit of the model owner, we consider fair allocation which
focus on the personal utility obtained by each participant. To
this end, we reflect fairness from two aspects: task contribution
and payment reward. Therefore, we capture fairness by the
principle that participants who make similar contributions to
the model training task should receive similar rewards. Hence,
we make use of the ρ-Lipschitz condition to formalize the
individual fairness rather than collective fairness. First, we
modify the ρ-Lipschitz condition to adapt to the payment rule
based on [19],
D(Υ(pi),Υ(pj)) ≤ d(pi, pj). (4)
The payment rule Υ : P → R+ is the strategy for the reward
of participants, D : R+ × R+ → R+ means the gap of
utility and d : P × P → R+ is a metric on participants
which can calculate the similarity between two participants.
In order to satisfy the requirement of individual fairness and
make participants willing to participate in a task, we design
a new form of individual fairness named Acceptance-Aware
Fairness (AAF). It guarantees individual fairness by ensuring
that any two participants who make similar contributions get
similar rewards.








}) ≥ 0. (5)
C. Problem Formulation
1) Multi-Dimensional Contract: For the fixed deadline sce-
nario, all participants can be classified into different types
based on their arriving time and computation capacity. How-
ever, these are all private information of the participants. To
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leverage on the self-revealing properties of participants, we
design a multi-dimensional contract for this scenario, which
establishes some rules that the model owner uses to regulate
the behavior of participants.
Definition 4. (MDC) A Multi-Dimensional Contract is repre-
sented as a 3-tuple (σ, π, γ), i.e., a participant classification
rule σ, a data quantity requirement rule %, and a payment
determination rule γ.
• σ : P → N∗ classifies participants into θ-type based on
the time constraint t = (ts, te) of the task, the arrival
time tai , departure time t
l
i and computation capacity ai
of participant pi ∈ P ,
θ = σ(t, tai , t
l
i, ai). (6)
• π : N∗ → R+ specifies the amount of data samples
qθ that the θ-type participant should contribute to model
training,
qθ = π(θ). (7)
• γ : N∗ × R+ → R+ defines the rules that rewards a
participant for its contribution according to her θ-type
and the amount of data samples qθ,
rθ = γ(θ, qθ). (8)
The self-revealing function of contract theory needs to sat-
isfy two fundamental properties, namely individual rationality
(IR) and incentive compatibility (IC), otherwise, the honesty
of participants cannot be guaranteed. The formal definitions
of IR and IC are given below.
Definition 5. (IR) A participant performs a training task only
when her utility is non-negative, i.e.,
ui = θiri − ciqi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ [1, n]. (9)
Definition 6. (IC) A participant can maximize her utility only
by honestly choosing the contract item designed for her type.
i.e.,
θiri − ciqi ≥ θirj − ciqj ,∀i 6= j ∈ [1, n]. (10)
For the model owner, the purpose of designing the contract
is to maximize her own utility, and it also needs to satisfy
AAF, IR and IC constraints, as shown below.
Definition 7. The optimal design of multi-dimensional con-









s.t. Eq.(5), (9), (10).
(11)
2) Multi-Metric Participant Recruitment Mechanism: For
the limited budget scenario, how to minimize the model
training time is a critical issue under the constraints of
prediction accuracy and budget feasibility. Since participants
can strategically choose tasks, it is difficult to control the
model training time, and hence the contract theory cannot
be applied to this scenario. To this end, we design a multi-
metric participant recruitment mechanism, to achieve optimal
control of time sensitivity by designing recruitment rules for
participants under the premise of limited budget.
Definition 8. (MMPR) A Multi-Metric Participant Recruit-
ment mechanism is represented as a 3-tuple (φ, ϕ, ψ), i.e., a
participant selection rule φ, a data amount contribution rule
ϕ, and a payment determination rule ψ.
• φ : P → {0, 1} specifies the selection strategy whether
participant pi ∈ P with arriving time tai and computation
capacity ai should be selected under the time constraint
t = (ts, te) and the budget B,
ζi = φ(t
a
i , ai, t,B) ∈ 0, 1. (12)
• ϕ : P → R+ refers to the amount of data contributed by
selected participant pi ∈ P to perform the model training
task, which is determined by ζi ∈ {0, 1}, tai and ai,
qi = ϕ(ζi, t
a
i , ai). (13)
• ψ : {0, 1}×{R+∪{0}} → R+∪{0} defines the rules that
rewards participant pi ∈ P for its contribution according
to ζi and qi,
ri = ψ(ζi, qi). (14)
We use the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) to measure
the prediction accuracy of the model, and useM data samples
to test the model performance and designing function G(M)









where ξm is predicted by the training model and ξ̂m is the
value of label. On top of that, we also consider a more complex
situation, namely budget feasibility. To this end, the optimal
design of multi-metric participant recruitment is equivalent to
how to minimize the model training time under the premise
of satisfying the above constraints.
Definition 9. The optimal design of multi-metric participant










 G(M) ≤ ε,∑ni=1 ri ≤ B,Eq.(5), (9).
(16)
The first constraint in Eq. (16) is to ensure the model
prediction accuracy achieve a certain performance. The second
one is to ensure the whole cost can not exceed the whole
budget B. The last one is used to satisfy both AAF and IR.
III. MULTI-DIMENSIONAL CONTRACT
For the fixed deadline, we first introduce entropy theory
to comprehensively measure the contributions of participants
from multi-dimensional properties. Based on an auxiliary
variable which reflects the participant’s type, we next sort all
participants and convert the multi-dimensional contract into
a single-dimensional one. Then, we relax the constraints for
contract feasibility in order to optimize the design.
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A. Conversion Into A Single-Dimensional Contract
Without loss of generality, we assume that participants are
indexed in a two-dimensional non-decreasing order: t1 ≤
· · · ≤ tn and a1 ≥ · · · ≥ an. First, we use entropy
method to estimate the weight of each dimension property.
The entropy coefficient ωj of the jth dimensional property















entropy of ith dimensional property, and vij denotes the value
of ith participant’s jth dimensional property. From the above
analysis, the entropy coefficient indicates the importance of
each dimensional property. According to the fuzzy compre-
hensive evaluation in [20], membership function is introduced
to represent the difference between one participant with the





where k̃j and k̂j are the maximum value and the minimum
value on the jth dimensional property, respectively. Based on
the entropy coefficient and the membership function, the task




ωj × f(vij). (19)
In order to account for a participant’s undertake ability to
the model training, we combine these two dimensions into
an auxiliary variable θ. We can now sort the n participants
by the calculated task contribution score in a non-decreasing
order as θ1 ≤ · · · ≤ θn.
B. Feasibility and Optimality of MDC
The necessary and sufficient conditions to guarantee con-
tract feasibility based on IR and IC constraints can be derived
as follows:
Property 1. A feasible contract must meet the following
necessary and sufficient conditions:
q1 ≤ · · · ≤ qN ,
r1 ≤ · · · ≤ rN ,
θ1r1 − c1q1 ≥ 0,
ci−1
θi−1
(qi − qi−1) ≥ ri − ri−1 ≥ ciθi (qi − qi−1),
log riri−1 ≤ d(si − si−1).
(20)
Proof: See Appendix A.
To find the optimal contract reward, we first establish the
dependence of optimal contract reward r∗i ,∀i ∈ [1, n] on the
quantity of data qi,∀i ∈ [1, n]. Then, the problem we need to
address only contains parameter qi,∀i ∈ [1, n].
Theorem 1. Given a set {q1, · · · , qn} that satisfies 0 < q1 <







4t,∀i ∈ [1, n], (21)
where 41 = 0, and 4t = 1θt ctqt −
1
θt
ct−1qt−1, ∀t ∈ [2, n].
Proof: See Appendix B
Given the time end point, the optimal design of a feasible
contract is equivalent to the optimal design of {qi}ni=1. Hence,
Eq. (11) can be rewrote as follows:
max
qi,∀i∈[1,n]

















0 < q1 < · · · < qn,
log riri−1 ≤ d(si − si−1).
(22)
As the objective function us(qi) is structurally separate from
different data quantities qi,∀i ∈ [1, n], i.e., us(qi) is indepen-
dent of us(qj), and thereby us(qi) is only associated with qi.
As such, the variable of each data quantity qi can be derived by
separately optimizing each us(qi),∀i ∈ [1, n]. When i = 1, we
just consider the constraint q1 ≥ 0, and compute q∗1 by using
the convex optimization tools such as cvxpy. When i ∈ [2, n],
we have 











s.t. qi−1 ≤ qi ≤ $i,∀i ∈ [2, n],
(23)
where $i = 1ci (θiri−1e
d(si−si−1) +ci−1qi−1−θiri−1) can be
computed by the AAF constraint. This problem can be trans-
formed into unconstraint optimization problem using Lagrange
factors:








+ α(qi − qi−1) + β($i − qi),
(24)
where α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0 are dual variables. The optimization
problem in Eq. (23) is a convex problem whose optmal primal










ciqi + α− β = 0,
α(qi − qi−1) = 0,
β($i − qi) = 0.
(25)





d(si−si−1) + ci−1qi−1 − θiri−1). (26)
Proof: See Appendix C.
IV. MULTI-METRIC PARTICIPANT RECRUITMENT
MECHANISM
For the limited budget scenario, by turning the time opti-
mization problem into the min-max problem of task assign-
ment which is NP-Hard, we design a multi-metric participants
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recruitment mechanism and propose an e-approximation algo-
rithm based on relaxed iterative optimization for it.
A. Conversion of MMPR Mechanism Design
Since it is intractable to accurately express and quantify
the performance of the training model, we simplify the time
minimization model training time problem by converting the
model performance constraint to the data amount constraint.
Lemma 1. G(M) ≤ ε can be reduced to
∑n
i=1 qi ≥ Q.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Next, we will design a Payment Determination Rule (PDR)
to satisfy AAF and IR.
Definition 10. (PDR)The payment determination rule is de-
fined as
ri = τsiqi, (27)
where τ = max (ci)si is the coefficient of proportionality.
Lemma 2. PDR satisfies IR and AAF.
Proof: See Appendix E.











i=1 qi ≤ Q̃,∑n
i=1 kiqi ≤ B,
0 ≤ qi ≤ q̃i,∀qi ∈ Z+.
(28)
B. Design and Analysis of Approximate Algorithm
Theorem 2. Eq. (28) is NP-Hard.
Proof: See Appendix F.
The problem of training time minimization as shown in Eq.
(28) is NP-Hard, as proved in Theorem 2, which means that it
is intractable to find the optimal solution for it. Consequently,
according to the idea of relaxed iterative optimization, we de-
sign an approximation algorithm named Relaxation Neighbor
Search (RNS) algorithm to calculate an approximate optimal
solution. The pseudo code of RNS is shown in Algorithm
1. First, we divide the task time length te − ts into m
time slices of equal lengh. The task completion time can
be found by making iteration from the present slice. From
line 6 to line 9, we calculate the maximum submission time
of each participant and sort participants in descending order
based on the maximum submission time. From line 10 to
line 12, we then relax the original problem by reducing the
budget constraints and use greedy strategy to get a solution.
The feasible solution can be obtained to satisfy the budget
constraint by dynamic adjustment from line 14 to 24. The
computational complexity of RNS mainly depends on two
factors: the ordering of participants and the secondary ad-
justment after greedy search. The computational complexity
of sorting participants is O(mn log n) and the worst time for
the adjustment is O(mn2 log n). Therefore, the computational
complexity of RNS is O(mn2 log n).
Lemma 3. RNS is an e-approximation for Eq. (28).
Proof: See Appendix G.
Algorithm 1: Relaxation Neighbor Search Algorithm
Input: Pk ⊆ P,∀k ∈ [1,m], {ta1 , · · · , tan}, C, B, Q, Q̃
Output: tc
1 for k = 1; k ≤ m; k + + do
2 for pi ∈ Pk ⊆ P do
3 si =
∑m
i=1 ωj × f(xi,j);






5 resort elements in {tui }
|Pk|
1 , so that
tu1 > · · · > tu|Pk|;
6 for tui ∈ {tui }n1 do
7 if
∑i
j=1 q̃j ≤ Q then
8 M =M∪ {pj};
9 rj = τsj q̃j ;
10 if
∑
i∈M ri ≤ B then








14 resort elements in {ri}|M|1 , so that
r1 < · · · < r|M|;
15 Bd =
∑
i∈M ri − B;
16 for ri ∈ {ri}|M|1 do
17 if
∑i
j=1 rj ≤ Bd then
18 Wh =Wh ∪ {pj};
19 for pi ∈ Pk/M do
20 if
∑
τsiqi ≤ Bd then
21 Wr =Wr ∪ {pi};
22 M = (M/Wh) ∪Wr;
23 update M using brand and bound method;
24 go to line 10;
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed
two mechanisms (i.e., multi-dimensional contract and multi-
metric participant recruitment mechanism) by using real-world
data and simulated data.
A. Experiment Setup
The code of our mechanisms are written in python with
pytorch. All the experiments have been carried out on a
standard desktop PC with an Intel Core i5 running at 2.3 GHz,
and with LPDDR3 8 GB 2133 MHz, running MacOS Mojave
10.14.6 Editions.
1) Datasets: we use both a simulated dataset and a standard
real-world dataset to perform comparative experiments.
Simulated Dataset. Without loss of generality, we first
divide the participants into 10 different types according to
their computation capacity, and assume that the computation
capacities of the participants obey a uniform distribution
θ ∼ U(1, 10). Next, we assume that 200 participants will
arrive at the platform randomly, and their arrival times obey a
uniform distribution ta ∼ U(0, 20).
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Figure 2. The performance of multi-dimensional contract from monotonicity, incentive compatibility, fairness and utility of participants with 10 different type



























































































Figure 3. Comparison of time consumption between multi-metric participant recruitment mechanism and the unfair one: (a) Fixed budget; (b) Fixed data
quantity; (c) Dynamic change.
Real-world Dataset. We utilize MNIST which is a standard
real-world dataset widely used in many related research work
[21], [22]. It is a good database of 10-class of handwritten
digits images which includes a training set of 60000 samples
and a testing set of 10000 samples. To show efficiency of
our proposed mechanisms, we utilize two most common
deeplearning models: Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN)
and MultiLayer Perceptron (MLP). The net structure of CNN
consists of three convolutional layers, two fully connected
layers and a softmax output layer. The net structure of MLP
consists of one input layer, four hidden layers and one output
layer. The optimizer of them are both stochastic gradient
descent.
2) Comparison Mechanisms: In order to make sufficient
comparisons with the state-of-the-art mechanisms, we select
the following two typical and relevant mechanisms as baselines
to compare with our proposed mechanism:
• NCF, which only focuses on maximizing utility without
taking any fairness into account.
• EA, which assigns the same number of tasks to all
participants, ignoring both fairness and the heterogeneity
of participants [23].
3) Metrics: In the simulated experiment, we use the utility
of both the participants and the model owner to evaluate
the compared mechanisms. In the real-world dataset-based
experiment, we mainly focus on prediction accuracy and time
consumption to compare our proposed mechanisms with the
others.
B. Results on Simulated Dataset
1) Multi-Dimensional Contract: In this part, we want to
validate the monotonicity, IR, IC and AAF of our designed
contract. We take 10 different types of participants into
consideration from the lowest 1-type to the highest 10-type.
From Figure 2(a), both the data sample size and the reward
of a participants monotonically increase with her type value.
This is because a participant with a higher type value should
make higher contribution to model training and receive more
reward. Thus, the numerical result verifies that MDC satisfies
the monotonicity. From Figure 2(b), a participant always
achieves the highest utility when it chooses the right contract
designed for her own type. On the contrary, the participant
will reduce her utility when choosing an inappropriate contract
for her type. This phenomenon is consistent with incentive
compatibility. In Figure 2(c), we use the palette to quantify
the difference in all type participants. The value of the color
with small number indicates low difference and strong fairness.
Obviously, our designed contract can guarantee that most
participants get fair rewards. According to the role of fairness,
the system of AFL will be much stable and sustainable. As
for participant’s utility in Figure 2(d), the participant’s utility
of all possible types has non-negative returns which satisfies
the IR constraint, and the utility of our designed contract with
fairness (CF) is less than NCF with minor difference. Then,
we demonstrate the change of the model owner’s utility with
different task deadline in Figure 2(e). The utility first increases
with the passage of time. This is because the participants who
stay in the system for a long time can use more data samples
to train the task to obtain higher model performance. As time
progresses, the prediction accuracy improves slowly, while the
rewards paid to participants increase linearly. Revenues and
payments are just offset from each other, and thus the mode
owner’s utility begins to decrease monotonically.
2) Multi-Metric Participant Recruitment Mechanism: In
order to show the efficiency of MMPR on time consumption,
we make a comparison between NCF and RNS. In Figure
3(a), we fix the budget with 200. It can be seen that the time
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TII.2021.3117861, IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Informatics








































































































































































































































Figure 5. The time consumption of multi-metric participant recruitment mechanism using MNIST: (a) CNN & P=4; (b) CNN & P=10; (c) MLP & P=4; (d)
MLP & P=10.
consumption of RNS monotonically increases with the data
quantity, while the time consumption of NCF is less than that
of RNS. This is because RNS takes more time to guarantee
the fair constraints. In Figure 3(b), we fix the data quantity
with 200. It can be seen from the graph that as the budget
increases, the time consumption will decrease. Obviously, the
model owner with a higher budget can hire more expensive
participants to perform tasks. Figure 3(c) draws a 3D graph
of time consumption changes under different budgets and
data quantities. It can be seen that the time consumption
monotonically increases with the data quantity, monotonically
decreases with the budget value, and the reason is the same
as the previous two figures.
C. Results on Real-world Dataset
1) Prediction Accuracy: Figure 4(a) and Figure 4(b) show
the prediction accuracy of the CNN model with different
numbers of participants. As the number of training rounds
increases, the prediction accuracy of CNN for each mechanism
increases monotonically. The prediction accuracy of CF is
generally lower than NCF but higher than EA. This is because
compared with NCF, CF takes into account the fairness factor,
which means that the difference in the amount of data that
participants should contribute is compressed, and the total
amount will be reduced accordingly. However, compared with
EA, EA ignores the heterogeneity of participants, resulting
in some unfinished tasks and low resource utilization. Figure
4(c) and 4(d) show the prediction accuracy of the MLP model
with different numbers of participants. The performance curve
trends of the three mechanisms and the differences between
them are basically the same as those in Figure 4(a) and Figure
4(b), and the reasons are also the same. The main difference
is that we can find that the prediction accuracy has fluctuated
growth, and there are some overlaps. The main reason for these
phenomena is that the training model from the training data
set is unstable, and cannot be applied to the test data set after
a few rounds. As the number of training rounds increases, the
fluctuations gradually disappear.
2) Time Consumption: Figure 5 show the time consumption
of the different models (i.e., CNN, MLP) with different num-
bers of participants. The curve trends of the four figures are
very similar. No matter which model is used, and how many
participants there are, the time consumption monotonically
increases with the data quantity. Compared Figure 5(a) with
Figure 5(b), the larger the number of participants, the less
time for model training. This is the same phenomenon in
Figure 5(c) with Figure 5(d). Compared the difference between
the three mechanisms in each figure, we can see that EA is
the most time-consuming of the three mechanisms, and the
difference between EA and other mechanisms will change
as the amount of data increases. This is because it ignores
the heterogeneity between devices, resulting in low resource
utilization. In contrast, RNS is far superior to EA and very
close to NCF. As the number of participants increases, the gap
between EA and others further increases, and the mechanism
of NCF and RNS will become more stable.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the fairness-aware time-
sensitive task allocation in AFL of CEI. For the fixed deadline
scenario, we have designed a multi-dimensional contract based
incentive mechanism to select heterogeneous participants to
finish task training honestly such that the social utility can be
maximized. For the limited budget scenario, we have designed
a multi-metric participant recruitment mechanism which can
iterative adjust task allocation to control time consumption,
proved the time control problem is NP-Hard and proposed
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an e-approximation algorithm based on relaxed iterative opti-
mization for it. We have also used real-world and simulated
data to conduct sufficient performance evaluations to further
validate the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed two
mechanisms in balancing the learning accuracy, fairness and
timeliness
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Property 1
The first two inequalities are about the data size and reward
monotonicity. The monotonicity of feasible contract can be
proofed by using IC constraint. We first prove the sufficiency,
e.g., if qx ≥ qy , it follows rx ≥ ry . From IC constraint, we
have {
θxrx − cxqx ≥ θxry − cxqy,
θyry − cyqy ≥ θyrx − cyqx.
(29)
Based on the first inequality in Eq. (29), we can further get
θx(rx − ry) ≥ cx(qx − qy) ≥ 0. (30)
Since θx ≥ 0 and cx ≥ 0, it follows that rx ≥ ry . Next, we
prove the necessity, e.g., if rx ≥ ry , it follows that qx ≥ qy .
Similarly, according to Eq. (30), we have
cy(qx − qy) ≥ θy(rx − ry) ≥ 0. (31)
It is obvious that qx ≥ qy . Therefore, data quantity strictly
monotonically increases with the payment reward.
The third inequality is the sufficient and necessary condi-
tions of IR. Following IC and the condition θ1 ≤ · · · ≤ θn,
we can obtain that
θiri − ciqi ≥ θ1r1 − c1q1 ≥ 0. (32)
As such, if the IR of type-θ1 participant is satisfied, the IR of
other participants with different types are naturally satisfied.
Next, we prove the fourth inequality. Based on the mono-
tonically of contract, IC can be reduced into incentive compat-
ibility between the adjacent participants. Thus, we only need
to prove the Local Downward Incentive Compatibility (LDIC)
and the local upward one. Let’s first take LDIC into account.
Consider three types of workers that θx−1 ≤ θx ≤ θx+1.
Following IC constraint, we have{
θx+1rx+1 − cx+1qx+1 ≥ θx+1rx − cx+1qx,
θxrx − cxqx ≥ θxrx−1 − cxqx−1.
(33)
Based on the monotonicity, we know that rx ≥ ry when θx ≥
θy . As such, we can get inequalities as follows:
θx+1(rx − rx−1) ≥ θx(rx − rx−1) ≥ cx+1(qx − qx−1).(34)
As such, we have
θx+1rx+1 − cx+1qx+1 ≥ θx+1rx−1 − cx+1qx−1. (35)
According to the property of monotonicity, we obtain
θx+1rx+1 − cx+1qx+1 ≥ θx+1r1 − cx+1q1. (36)
Hence, if the IC constraint can be guaranteed by type-θx+1
participants, it will also be guaranteed by type-θx participants.
This process can be extended downward from type-θx+1 to
type-θ1, e.g., all LDICs are held and it is same as the upward
one.
At last, we give the proof of the sufficient and necessary
condition of AAF constraints: based on the monotonicity
of contract, AAF constraints can be reduced to guarantee
individual fairness between the adjacent participants. Consider
three types of workers that θx−1 ≤ θx ≤ θx+1, we can get
inequalities as follows:{
log rx+1rx ≤ d(sx+1 − sx),
log rxrx−1 ≤ d(sx − sx−1).
(37)










≤ d(sx+1 − sx−1). (38)
As such, the sufficient and necessary conditions of monotonic-
ity, IR, IC and AAF constraints are proved.
B. Proof of Theorem 1




ciqi, if i = 1,





For the sake of contradiction, there exist some r+ in a feasible
contract that yields greater profit for the model owner, i.e.,
π(r+) > π(r∗). For simplicity, we only need to consider the







i . This implies that there exists at least a
t ∈ [1, n] that satisfies inequality r+t < r∗t . According to the
LDIC conditions in the proof of Property 1, we have{
r+t > r
+











We thus can deduce that r+(t−1) < r
∗
(t−1). Continuing this






this violates IR constraint. Therefore, this theorem is proved.
C. Proof of Corollary 1
There are four cases: (i) α = 0 and β = 0: it’s impossible
for the first equation in Eq. (25) to be true because the utility
of participant is greater than zero. (ii) α > 0 and β = 0: it
doesn’t work for the same reason as the first case. (iii)α > 0
and β > 0: it cannot make both the second equation and the
third one in Eq. (25) to be true at the same time. (iv) α = 0
and β > 0: there is a solution that makes all three equations
true, and hence we can obtain q∗i as shown in Eq. (26).
D. Proof of Lemma 1
We consider n participants with the local data sets
{q1, q2, . . . , qn} and denote w∗ as the optimal solution of
model parameters. In the learning problem, the task is to find
the objective parameters w by optimizing the loss function.
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j=1 qj denotes the total training data amount.
In order to achieve the model performance to a certain extent,
we need to control the error between the global loss function
and the optimal solution of the model within a certain range.
Without loss of generality, we assume that F (w) is convex and
L-smooth and after T global update on the server, we have
E[F (wT )−F (w∗)] ≤ (1− 2µγηk)T [F (w0)−F (w∗)]. (43)
Each update consume data amount Ψ and the total data
amount which needs to converges to a global optimum w∗
is Q = T ∗ Ψ. Therefore, we can find that the model can
achieve certain performance by controlling the data volume of





m=1 (ξm − ξ̂m)
2
≤ ε can be
reduced to
∑N
i=1 qi ≥ Q.
E. Proof of Lemma 2
IR is naturally satisfied for each pi, its utility is larger than
zero because τsi − ci ≥ 0 where τ = max (ci)si .
As for AAF, we assume that participant pi is superior to





≤ d(pi − pj). (44)
According to the definitions of AAF and the payment deter-







≤ d((si, qi), (sj , qj)). (45)
Then, we only need to prove that
siqi − log siqi ≥ sjqj − log sjqj . (46)
Therefore, we need to proof that f(x) = x− log x monoton-
ically increases with the specified interval. It is obvious that
df(x)
dx = 1 −
1
x > 0 as for siqi and sjqj . Thus, the proposed
PDR satisfies AAF.
F. Proof of Theorem 2
We show that Eq. (28) is NP-Hard by reducing the NP-
hard instance of bounded knapsack problem to its special
case. In the instance of bounded knapsack problem, for a
set of items numbered from 1 to n, U = {u1, · · · , un}
where item ui is specified by its positive profit vi, its positive
weight wi, a bound ni ∈ N on the number of available
copies and a knapsack of capacity C. It can be described
as a decision problem: Is there a subset of items with total
weight at most b, such that the corresponding value is at
least a. Given a bounded knapsack problem instance X (U , C)
and the special case of time sensitivity control problem of
task allocation instance Y(P,B), the Y(P,B) can be reduced
from the X (U , C) by following steps: (i) Let a set P of the
participants is the universal set U , and the knapsack’s capacity
C is equal to the whole budget B. (ii) Add the data amount γi
of each participant pi for each bound ni ∈ N . (iii) As for the
payment kiqi of each participant, let the positive weight wi
be same as it if it is selected. Otherwise the payment is zero.
It is obvious that the solution of Y(P,B) which participants’
payment should not exceed the budget and the final task yields
must reach a certain threshold is equal to the solution of
X (U , C) in polynomial time. Hence, this theorem is proved.
G. Proof of Lemma 3
We first relax the original problem by reducing the budget
constraints. Then we use greedy strategy to get the solution
to the relaxation problem and use M to denote the solution
to the relaxation problem without budget. Next, we define the
optimal solution of the original problem as opt and the same
of RNS as apx. It is obvious that the solution apt is better
than opx and inferior to M. We define the amount of task
data that needs secondary adjustment as q which needs to
transform from high payment participant rh to low payment
participant rl. Based on the proposed determination rule and






≤ ed(pi,pj) ≤ e, (47)










Based on the definition of membership function in Eq. (18),




















We then can obtain that the time consumption of the solu-
tion is less than the one of e*M, and hence this is an e-
approximation.
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